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I. THE FRANKENSTEIN COMPLEX
When I was a boy, I read all of Isaac Asimov’s stories about robotics. In 
Asimov’s world, robots were gradually integrated into every aspect of society. 
They had various degrees of similarity to humans, but as the stories and novels 
progressed, the most advanced robots were very human in appearance and form.
The most famous feature of these robot stories is Asimov’s three laws of 
robotics that were built into every robot’s positronic brain.
The three laws are:
First Law: “a robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, 
allow a human being to come to harm.”1
Second Law: “a robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except 
where such orders would conflict with the First Law.”2
Third Law: “a robot must protect its own existence as long as such 
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.”3
                                                                                                                     
Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment; Director, The 
Information Society Project, Yale Law School. This Lecture was originally presented as the 
2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy at the Ohio State 
University Moritz College of Law on October 27, 2016. My thanks to Dennis Hirsch, Margot 
Kaminski and Frank Pasquale for their comments.
1 ISAAC ASIMOV, Runaround, in I, ROBOT 41, 53 (Gnome Press 1st ed. 1950).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 54.
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These three laws have been very influential, and even today people imagine 
what it would be like—or whether it would even be possible—to build them into 
robots, including, for example, into self-driving cars.4
As a dramatic device, the laws of robotics replaced one familiar trope about 
robots with a far more interesting one. The older trope was the idea of the 
Frankenstein monster or the killer robot, which becomes evil or goes berserk. 
An example of this literary theme in the Terminator movie franchise is the 
neural network Skynet becoming self-aware and taking over the world.5 But 
Asimov wrote his robot stories to counteract what he called the “Frankenstein 
Complex”—the idea that robots were inherently menacing or evil, and that 
human beings would inevitably create mechanical beings who would turn on 
their creators.6 In many of his stories, in fact, people start out as prejudiced 
against robots and then end up seeing their value. For example, the protagonist 
of several of his stories, Detective Elijah Bailey, who is initially skeptical of
robots, eventually becomes best friends with R. Daneel Olivaw, his robotic 
partner.7
By creating the three laws, Asimov made things much more interesting. 
Instead of just worrying about whether robots would eventually turn on us, he 
raised an additional problem that is very near and dear to lawyers—this is the 
problem of legal interpretation. What do we—or in some cases, the robots 
themselves—do when the laws are unclear, or when they conflict? By creating 
the three laws, Asimov moved our imagination about robots from threats to 
objects of interpretation and regulation, and thus sources of irony and conflict. 
It is a very sophisticated idea, and one that he develops in many of his stories.
Today, it’s quite unclear whether we could actually build the three laws that 
Asimov postulated into robots and artificial intelligence (AI) agents. After all, 
Asimov’s three laws seem rather vague and incomplete. They might have 
loopholes.
                                                                                                                     
4 See Boer Deng, Machine Ethics: The Robot’s Dilemma, NATURE (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.nature.com/news/machine-ethics-the-robot-s-dilemma-1.17881
[https://perma.cc/5HT6-EEFA] (relating Asimov’s three laws to the developing field of 
machine ethics); cf. Ulrike Barthelmess & Ulrich Furbach, Do We Need Asimov’s Laws?,
CORNELL U. LIB. 11 (2014), https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1405/1405.0961.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YSC2-WZYJ] (arguing that the laws reflect cultural anxieties about robots, 
and it is unnecessary to build the laws into actual robots).
5 THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale Film Corp. 1984).
6 Isaac Asimov, The Machine and the Robot, in SCIENCE FICTION: CONTEMPORARY 
MYTHOLOGY 244, 250–53 (Patricia Warrick et al. eds., 1978); Lee McCauley, The 
Frankenstein Complex and Asimov’s Three Laws, in HUMAN IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN-
ROBOT INTERACTION 9, 9–10 (Ass’n for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 
Workshop Technical Report No. WS-07-07, 2007), https://www.aaai.org/Papers/Workshops/
2007/WS-07-07/WS07-07-003.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ9F-FHTJ].
7 E.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, THE CAVES OF STEEL 13–14, 190–91 (1954); ISAAC ASIMOV,
Mirror Image, in ROBOT VISIONS 319, 319 (1990); ISAAC ASIMOV, THE NAKED SUN 19–20 
(Harper Collins 1996) (1957); ISAAC ASIMOV, THE ROBOTS OF DAWN 30–31 (1983).
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Of course, that was part of the point. A recurring trope in Asimov’s stories 
is that the three laws are unclear, or vague, or might conflict in certain 
circumstances. Thus, the plot often turned on clever ways to interpret or 
reinterpret the laws of robotics, or on how to resolve conflicts between them, 
and so on. And in a late novel, Daneel Olivaw, a robot who begins as a detective 
but ends up being a very important figure in the novels, becomes so advanced 
that he creates his own “zeroth” law—“A robot may not injure humanity or,
through inaction, allow humanity to come to harm”—that precedes all of the 
others that he received in his original programming.8
In any case, my goal is to ask how we might use Asimov’s idea of the laws 
of robotics today. When I talk of robots, however, I will include not only 
robots—embodied material objects that interact with their environment—but 
also artificial intelligence agents and machine learning algorithms. That is 
perfectly consistent with Asimov’s concerns, I think. Although Asimov wrote 
primarily about robots, he also wrote about very intelligent computers.9 And the 
Frankenstein syndrome that he was trying to combat could arise from fear of AI 
or algorithms as much as fear of embodied robots. Today, people seem to fear 
not only robots, but also AI agents and algorithms, including machine learning 
systems.10 Robots seem to be just a special case of a far larger set of concerns.
We are rapidly moving from the age of the Internet to the Algorithmic 
Society, and soon we will look back on the digital age as the precursor to the 
Algorithmic Society. What do I mean by the Algorithmic Society? I mean a 
society organized around social and economic decision-making by algorithms, 
robots, and AI agents, who not only make the decisions but also, in some cases, 
carry them out. The use of robots and AI, therefore, is just a special case of the 
Algorithmic Society. 
Big Data, too, is a feature of the Algorithmic Society. In fact, Big Data is 
just the flip side of a society organized around algorithmic decision-making. Big 
Data is the fuel that runs the Algorithmic Society; it is also the product of its 
operations. Collection and processing of data produces ever more data, which 
                                                                                                                     
8 ISAAC ASIMOV, ROBOTS AND EMPIRE 291 (1985); see also JOSEPH A. ANGELO,
ROBOTICS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE NEW TECHNOLOGY 103 (2007).
9 E.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, The Last Question, in ROBOT DREAMS 220, 220 (1986).
10 See, e.g., Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could 
End Mankind, BBC (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540
[https://perma.cc/JJE2-95RL]; Samuel Gibbs, Elon Musk: Artificial Intelligence Is Our Biggest 
Existential Threat, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2014/oct/27/elon-musk-artificial-intelligence-ai-biggest-existential-threat [https://perma.cc/
KGV3-GAV5] (“With artificial intelligence we are summoning the demon.”). Roboticists 
and AI researchers, on the other hand, may support specific forms of regulation but tend to 
be less frightened. See, e.g., Connie Loizos, This Famous Roboticist Doesn’t Think Elon 
Musk Understands AI, TECH CRUNCH (July 19, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/19/
this-famous-roboticist-doesnt-think-elon-musk-understands-ai/ [https://perma.cc/TC7R-NUK5]
(quoting Rodney Brooks as pointing out that the famous people like Musk who are most 
concerned about artificial intelligence “don’t work in AI themselves,” while “regulation on 
self-driving Teslas . . . [is] a real issue”).
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in turn, can be used to improve the performance of algorithms.11 To vary Kant’s
famous dictum, algorithms without data are empty; data without algorithms are 
blind.12
In this Lecture, I’m going to offer three new laws of robotics for the 
Algorithmic Society. In the process, I will also introduce four important 
theoretical ideas that will help us understand how we should regulate these 
entities. The four ideas are (1) the homunculus fallacy; (2) the substitution effect;
(3) the concept of information fiduciaries; and (4) the idea of algorithmic 
nuisance. I’ll explain these four ideas as the Lecture progresses.
Although I am inspired by Asimov’s three laws of robotics, I nevertheless 
will describe the idea of “laws of robotics” very differently than he did.
First, these laws will not be limited to robots—they will apply to AI agents 
and algorithms, including machine learning algorithms. And when I want to talk 
about all three together as a group, I will talk about the laws of algorithms 
generally.
Second, when people think about robots in science fiction, they often think 
of self-contained entities. But today we know that many robots and AI agents 
are connected to the cloud.13 That is certainly true of the Internet of things and 
home robots. It is likely to be true of self-driving cars as well. So the laws of 
robotics, whatever they are, are also likely to be the laws of cloud intelligences 
that are connected to the Internet.
Third, because robots are cloud robots, we shouldn’t forget that one of the 
central issues in the study of robotics and artificial intelligence is the handling 
of data and, in particular, Big Data. Robots are nothing without data; and 
because many robots will be cloud robots, and many AI systems will be 
                                                                                                                     
11 See, e.g., Fuel of the Future: Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21721634-how-it-shaping-up-
data-giving-rise-new-economy [https://perma.cc/H6RR-FZU2] (“Data will be the ultimate 
externality: we will generate them whatever we do.”); Amir Gandomi & Murtaza Haider, 
Beyond the Hype: Big Data Concepts, Methods, and Analytics, 35 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 137, 
140 (2015), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0268401214001066 
[https://perma.cc/W3DL-YC5R] (describing how companies use algorithms to turn vast 
amounts of unstructured data into new forms of data that in turn can be used for analysis and 
decision-making); SINTEF, Big Data, for Better or Worse: 90% of World’s Data Generated 
over Last Two Years, SCIENCEDAILY (May 22, 2013), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
2013/05/130522085217.htm [https://perma.cc/2G8V-ZYKE] (“Each and every one of us is 
constantly producing and releasing data about ourselves. We do this either by moving around 
passively—our behaviour being registered by cameras or card usage—or by logging onto 
our PCs and surfing the net.”). 
12 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 193–94 [A51/B76] (Paul Guyer & 
Allen W. Wood eds. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1998) (“Thoughts without content 
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”).
13 See Ben Kehoe et al., A Survey of Research on Cloud Robotics and Automation, 12
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATION SCI. & ENGINEERING 398, 400 (2015), 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7006734&tag=1 [https://perma.cc/
DW7U-C4XU] (“The Cloud can provide robots and automation systems with access to vast 
resources of data that are not possible to maintain in onboard memory.”).
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connected to the Internet cloud, they will depend heavily on data analytics.14
Data is the fuel that drives the engines of artificial intelligence.
So when we talk about robots, AI agents, and algorithms, we are also usually 
talking about Big Data and Internet connection, just as when we talk about Big 
Data, we are also usually talking about the regulation of robots, algorithms and 
AI agents that process it. The laws of robotics are also the laws of robotics, 
algorithms, and AI in the age of Big Data. Hence, the title of this Lecture.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, Asimov called his laws the laws of 
robotics, not the laws of robot-users or robot-programmers or robot-operators.15
His laws were robot-directed.16 They were robot-centric—that is, they were 
programming instructions inserted into the code of the robots themselves. They 
were laws that robots had to follow—because they were programmed that 
way—and not that users of robots had to follow.17 You can imagine such 
instructions also being part of AI agents or algorithms as a check on the 
algorithm’s machine learning. They are a sort of software side constraint, in the 
same way that rights are side constraints on action.
To be sure, humans were required to program the laws into every robot, but 
the laws themselves were addressed to the robots, not to the humans.18 Asimov 
doesn’t say much about the human laws that required this programming, but one 
assumes that there was some sort of government requirement that they be placed 
into every robot’s positronic brain.
I will diverge from Asimov at this point. Instead of focusing on laws 
directed at robots (or algorithms), I focus on laws directed at the people who 
program and use robots, AI agents, and algorithms. That is because what we 
need in the emerging Algorithmic Society are not laws of robotics, but laws of 
robot-operators.
The conceit of the Algorithmic Society is the harnessing of data and 
algorithms to govern and improve society. The ambition of the Algorithmic 
Society is omniscience—to know all and to predict all—an ambition as old as 
humanity itself, but now seemingly ever closer to being within our grasp.
In the Algorithmic Society, the central problem of regulation is not the 
algorithms, but the human beings who use them, and who allow themselves to 
be governed by them. Algorithmic governance is the governance of humans by 
humans using a particular technology of analysis and decision-making.
                                                                                                                     
14 Bob Violino, Big Data and Robotics: A Long History Together, ZDNET (Aug. 12, 
2016), http://www.zdnet.com/article/big-data-and-robotics-a-long-history-together/ 
[https://perma.cc/CA9W-C8VC] (noting that the concept of Big Data “has long been a part 
of the world of robotics,” and that “[r]obotics was always about data”); Kehoe et al., supra
note 13, at 401 (explaining how access to Big Data in the cloud enhances the ability of robots 
to perform tasks and interact with their environments).
15 ASIMOV, supra note 1, at 53.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 53–54.
1222 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:5
Hence our need is not for robot-directed laws like Asimov’s three laws of 
robotics, but laws directed at those who use robots to analyze, control, and 
exercise power over other human beings.
II. THE RABBI AND THE GOLEM
Let me explain this idea with a story. Margot Kaminski and I taught the first 
law and robotics course at Yale Law School in the spring of 2014. She came up 
with a reading list that I have used in subsequent years. For the first class, she 
chose a selection of famous literary examples, including a short story by Asimov 
which announces the three laws,19 and Karel Čapek’s 1921 play, R.U.R.,20
which is the origin of the word “robot.” She also chose a version of the legend 
of the Golem of Prague.21
According to legend, the Golem of Prague was created by Rabbi Judah 
Loew ben Bezalel, the Maharal, a sixteenth-century sage widely revered for his 
learning and piety.22 The Maharal used the secret knowledge of Jewish 
mysticism to create a living thing out of clay, just as God had created Adam. He 
brought it to life by speaking the divine name. The Golem looked like a human. 
It was very strong, but it could not speak because, as the legend says, the power 
of speech was given to man alone by God23 (the next time you talk to Siri, 
consider how things have changed).
In any case, the Maharal sets the Golem off to deal with threats to the Jewish 
community. In the legend, the Golem acts as a detective—just like Asimov’s
Daneel Olivaw. He finds out who is slandering the Jews, and he captures the 
bad guys. Then, having served his purpose, he returns to the Rabbi, who does 
the same secret incantations backwards, and the Golem turns back into a lifeless 
lump of clay, where he is stored in the attic of the synagogue.24
What is the point of this story? Well, the most interesting thing about this 
version of the story is what does not happen. The Golem doesn’t go crazy. He 
doesn’t catch the wrong person. The Rabbi’s wife doesn’t discover the Golem 
and accidentally set it loose; the Rabbi’s son-in-law doesn’t use the Golem to 
make money; an unscrupulous person doesn’t retrain the Golem to do evil, and 
so on. In fact, nothing bad happens in this story. The Golem does exactly what 
it is supposed to do. And in a way, this version of the legend is rather boring; 
                                                                                                                     
19 The story is Runaround. Id.
20 KAREL ČAPEK, R.U.R. (1921).
21 The Golem of Prague, in A TREASURY OF JEWISH FOLKLORE 603 (Nathan Ausubel 
ed., 1948).
22 Judah Loew ben Bezalel (The Maharal of Prague), HOLY PEOPLE OF THE WORLD: A
CROSS-CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 450 (Phyllis G. Jestice ed., 2004) (“[T]he Maharal was 
respected as a learned and pious man by Jew and gentile alike.”); JOAN COMAY, WHO’S WHO 
IN JEWISH HISTORY: AFTER THE PERIOD OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 208 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 1995) (noting that the Maharal was “[g]reatly revered for his piety and scholarship”).
23 The Golem of Prague, supra note 21, at 607–08.
24 Id. at 609–11.
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there are other versions of the Golem legend in which things go wrong, and it’s
far more interesting dramatically.25
But the most important lesson we can draw from this story is that the reason 
nothing goes wrong is that the Golem is programmed and employed by the 
Maharal, a man of the greatest piety and learning. Only a truly righteous man, 
or a saint, you might say, is capable of using the Golem only for good. 
And this, in my view, is the real lesson of the story. When we talk about 
robots, or AI agents, or algorithms, we usually focus on whether they cause 
problems or threats. But in most cases, the problem isn’t the robots; it’s the 
humans.
Why is the problem the humans, and not the robots?
First, the humans design the algorithms, program them, connect them to 
databases, and set them loose.
Second, the humans decide how to use the algorithms, when to use them, 
and for what purpose.
Third, humans program the algorithms with data, whose selection, 
organization, and content contains the residue of earlier discriminations and 
injustices.
Fourth, although people talk about what robots did or what AI agents did, 
or what algorithms did, this way of speaking misses an important point. These 
technologies mediate social relations between human beings and other human 
beings. Technology is embedded into—and often disguises—social relations.
When algorithms discriminate or do bad things, therefore, we always need 
to ask how the algorithms are engaged in reproducing and giving effect to 
particular social relations between human beings. These are social relations that 
produce and reproduce justice and injustice, power and powerlessness, superior 
status and subordination.
The robots, AI agents, and algorithms are the devices through which these 
social relations are produced, and through which particular forms of power are 
processed and transformed.
This is what I mean when I say that the problem is not the robots; it is the 
humans.
III. THE HOMUNCULUS FALLACY
This brings me to the first of the four ideas that I promised I would talk 
about in this Lecture. I have coined a phrase—the homunculus fallacy—to 
describe the way that people tend to think about robots, AI agents, and 
algorithms. The homunculus fallacy is the belief that there is a little person 
inside the program who is making it work—who has good intentions or bad 
intentions, and who makes the program do good or bad things.
                                                                                                                     
25 See, e.g., SHARON BARCAN ELSWIT, THE JEWISH STORY FINDER: A GUIDE TO 668
TALES LISTING SUBJECTS AND SOURCES 204–05 (2d ed. 2012) (listing the basic story and 
variations in Jewish literature).
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But, in fact, there is no little person inside the algorithm. There is 
programming—code—and there is data. The program uses the data to run, with 
good or bad effects, some predictable, some unpredictable.
When we criticize algorithms, we are really criticizing the programming, or 
the data, or their interaction. But equally important, we are also criticizing the 
use to which they are being put by the humans who programmed the algorithms, 
collected the data, or employed the algorithms and the data to perform particular 
tasks. We are criticizing the Rabbi, not the Golem.
So what kinds of social relations do these technologies produce and 
reproduce? In order to explain this, I need to introduce the second of the four 
ideas in this Lecture, an idea which I’ve discussed previously. This is the 
substitution effect.26
The substitution effect refers to the effects on society that occur when
robots, AI agents, and algorithms substitute for human beings, and operate as 
special purpose people.27 The notion of robot or algorithm as substitute conveys 
four different ideas: (1) the substitute is in some ways better than the original; 
(2) the substitute is in other ways more limited than the original; (3) people treat 
the substitute as if it were alive—they engage in animism or anthropomorphism; 
and (4) the substitute acts as a fetish or deflection away from the social bases of 
power among human beings and groups of human beings.28
First, substitution means superiority: robots, AI agents, and algorithms are 
often more powerful and quicker than human beings and human decision-
makers.29 They can see things, do things, analyze things and make decisions 
that human beings could never do. They never tire of doing them, and they have 
no emotional distractions and no emotional compunction about doing them.30
Second, substitution also means limitation or deficiency. Robots, AI agents 
and algorithms have limited abilities. They can do only some things, but not 
others. They lack many of the features of human judgment.31
                                                                                                                     
26 Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 45, 46, 55–59 (2015).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 57–59.
29 Id. at 59.
30 Id. at 58–59.
31 Anupam Rastogi, Artificial Intelligence—Human Augmentation Is What’s Here and 
Now, MEDIUM (Jan. 12, 2017), https://medium.com/reflections-by-ngp/artificial-intelligence-
human-augmentation-is-whats-here-and-now-c5286978ace0 [https://perma.cc/3J7Q-FJJK] (noting 
that “[m]achines are in their relative infancy” in exercising common sense judgments that 
are easy for human beings, “in spite of rapid strides in Natural Language Processing using 
deep learning”); see also Catherine Havasi, Who’s Doing Common-Sense Reasoning and 
Why It Matters, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 9, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/08/09/guide-to-
common-sense-reasoning-whos-doing-it-and-why-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/U938-MGJD] 
(noting that a central challenge of artificial intelligence research is developing capabilities 
for contextual, common-sense reasoning).
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Third, substitution involves the projection of life, agency, and intention onto 
programs and machines.32 This also encourages the projection of responsibility 
from the humans using the algorithms to the algorithms themselves—hence the 
homunculus fallacy.
Fourth, substitution involves a fetish or ideological deflection. Marx 
famously spoke of the fetishism of commodities.33 Just as ancient societies 
believed that totems, which were inanimate objects, were imbued with magical 
powers, Marx argued that people in a market society treat the commodity as if 
it has value, when in fact what gives it value is the fact that it is embedded in a 
system of social relations.34 Markets are social relationships that both empower 
people and allow people to exercise power over each other.
What is true of commodities in markets is also true of the use of 
technological substitutes in the form of robots, AI agents and algorithms. These 
technologies become part of social relations of power among individuals and 
groups. We must not confuse the Golem with the Rabbi. The effects of robotics 
are always about the relationships of power between human beings or groups of 
human beings.
Recently, the media reported a story about an algorithm for picking beauty 
contestants that preferred white people.35 Such stories encourage the idea that 
algorithms have psychological biases. This is yet another example of the 
homunculus fallacy—there is no little beauty contestant judge inside the 
algorithm who is employing his or her prejudices. There is the history of 
previous beauty pageants, the cultural assumptions about beauty that inform 
these pageants, the kind of data that is collected, the way that the data is 
collected, the code that the algorithm employs, and the code for revising the 
code, if the algorithm employs machine learning. There are also the people who 
set the algorithm loose for a particular task. We must always remember that 
behind the Golem is the Rabbi (or a whole society of Rabbis) who make and use 
the Golem.
                                                                                                                     
32 Balkin, supra note 26, at 57.
33 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 81 (Fredrick Engels 
ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Charles H. Kerr & Co. 1909) (“The Fetishism 
of Commodities and the Secret Thereof.”).
34 Id. at 83 (“A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the 
social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the 
product of that labour.”).
35 Sam Levin, A Beauty Contest Was Judged by AI and the Robots Didn’t Like Dark 
Skin, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/08/
artificial-intelligence-beauty-contest-doesnt-like-black-people [https://perma.cc/46AK-D8CL]. 
A company called Beauty.AI devised the algorithm. See Welcome to the First International 
Beauty Contest Judged by Artificial Intelligence: Beauty.AI 2.0, BEAUTY.AI, http://beauty.ai/
[https://perma.cc/Z8H8-22WY].
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IV. THE LAWS OF AN ALGORITHMIC SOCIETY
Let me summarize the argument so far. I began this Lecture with Asimov’s
three laws of robotics. I noted that these laws were laws directed to robots and 
to their code. Then, using the story of the Golem, I pointed out that the problem 
is not the robots, but the human beings. If so, then rather than Asimov’s laws of 
robotics, what we really need are laws of robotics designers and operators. The 
laws of robotics that we need in our Algorithmic Society are laws that control 
and direct the human beings who create, design, and employ robots, AI agents, 
and algorithms. And because algorithms without data are empty, these are also 
the laws that control the collection, collation, use, distribution and sale of the 
data that make these algorithms work.
In sum, the laws of robotics that we need are laws governing the humans 
who make and use robots and the data that robots use.
What kinds of laws would these be? Return to my central point—that behind 
the robots, AI agents, and algorithms are social relations between human beings 
and groups of human beings. So the laws we need are obligations of fair dealing, 
nonmanipulation, and nondomination between those who make and use the 
algorithms and those who are governed by them.
People use algorithms to classify and govern populations of people. Because 
the relationship is one of governance, the obligations are fiduciary—of good 
faith, manipulation, and nondomination. These are the principles that should 
guide the Algorithmic Society. Unlike Asimov’s three laws, these principles are 
not automatically built into the robots. We have to ensure that they characterize 
relationships between human beings. We must build them into our human 
society; we must program them into our laws.
What duties do algorithm users have toward society? To answer that 
question, consider the ambition of the Algorithmic Society. The dream of the 
Algorithmic Society is the omniscient governance of society.
From the ambitions come the harms. They include, in addition to the 
possibility of physical injury, violations of privacy, exposure, reputational harm, 
discrimination, regimentation (or normalization), and manipulation.
The Algorithmic Society is a way of governing populations. By governance, 
I mean the way that people who control algorithms analyze, control, direct, 
order, and shape the people who are the subjects of the data. People use 
algorithms to classify, select, comprehend, and make decisions about entire 
populations of people. This relationship is not simply a relationship of market 
profit. It is also a relationship of governance. 
The Algorithmic Society also involves relationships of informational 
power. The AI knows a lot about you, but you don’t know a lot about the AI. 
Moreover, you can’t monitor very well what the AI agent or algorithm does. 
There is an asymmetry of power and an asymmetry of information between 
operators and those acted on or governed. This asymmetry is a central feature 
of the Algorithmic Society—it is the asymmetry of knowledge and of power 
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between the public and private governors of the Algorithmic Society and those 
who are governed by them.
What are the three laws—or more correctly, the legal principles—of the 
Algorithmic Society? They are three principles of fair governance.
(1) With respect to clients, customers, and end-users, algorithm users are 
information fiduciaries.
(2) With respect to those who are not clients, customers, and end-users, 
algorithm users have public duties. If they are governments, this follows from 
their nature as governments. If they are private actors, their businesses are 
affected with a public interest, as constitutional lawyers would have said during 
the 1930s.36
(3) The central public duty of algorithm users is to avoid externalizing the 
costs (harms) of their operations. The best analogy for the harms of algorithmic 
decision-making is not intentional discrimination, but socially unjustified 
pollution. Obligations of transparency, interpretability, due process and 
accountability flow from these three substantive requirements. Transparency—
and its cousins, due process, accountability, and interpretability—apply in 
different ways with respect to all three principles.
Accountability, transparency, interpretability, and due process may be 
fiduciary obligations. They may follow from public duties. And they may be a 
prophylactic measure to prevent unjustified externalization of harms, or to 
provide a remedy for harm.
Let me discuss these three legal principles of robotics in turn.
V. FIRST LAW: ALGORITHMIC OPERATORS ARE INFORMATION 
FIDUCIARIES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CLIENTS AND END-USERS
To discuss the first legal principle, I introduce yet another of the key ideas 
that I promised that I would mention in the course of this Lecture. This is the
idea of information fiduciaries, a concept that I’ve developed in previous 
work.37 To understand what an information fiduciary is, we should first ask, 
what is a fiduciary? Examples of fiduciaries are professionals like doctors and 
lawyers, and people who manage estates or other people’s property.38 What 
makes someone a fiduciary is that people depend on them to provide services, 
but there is a significant asymmetry in knowledge and ability between fiduciary 
and client. The client is in a position of special vulnerability, and can’t easily 
monitor what the fiduciary is doing on his or her behalf.39 As a result, the law 
                                                                                                                     
36 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934) (“The phrase ‘affected with a 
public interest’ can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate 
reason, is subject to control for the public good.”).
37 See generally Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) (introducing and explaining the concept of an information 
fiduciary).
38 Id. at 1207.
39 Id. at 1216–17.
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requires fiduciaries to act in a trustworthy manner, in good faith, and to avoid 
creating conflicts of interest with the client or patient.40 Fiduciaries often collect 
sensitive personal information about their clients, which they could use to their 
client’s detriment. Hence the law requires them to protect their client’s privacy 
and not to disclose information in ways that would harm their clients.41 When 
fiduciaries collect and process information about their clients, we can give them 
a special name. They are information fiduciaries.42 Most professionals who are 
fiduciaries are also information fiduciaries.43
Fiduciaries have two central duties. The first is a duty of care.44 The second 
is a duty of loyalty.45 The duty of care means that a fiduciary has to act with 
reasonable care to avoid harming the client or patient.46 The duty of loyalty 
means that the fiduciary has to avoid creating conflicts of interest with their 
clients or patients and must look out for their interests.47 The degree of loyalty 
demanded depends on the nature of the relationship between the fiduciary and 
the client.
The digital age has created a new set of entities that have many features 
similar to traditional fiduciaries. They include large online businesses like 
Google, Facebook, and Uber. These businesses collect, collate, analyze, and use 
information about us.48 Indeed, they collect enormous amounts of information 
about us, which could, in theory, be used to our detriment. These businesses 
have become quite important, in some cases indispensable, to our everyday 
lives. There is also an asymmetry of knowledge between businesses and their 
end-users and clients. Online businesses know a lot about us;49 we know 
comparatively little about their operations, and they treat their internal processes 
as proprietary to avoid theft by competitors.50 At the same time, these businesses 
attempt to reassure their end-users that they will respect their privacy and will 
not betray their trust.51 Because they are, in Frank Pasquale’s terms, a black 
box,52 most people simply have to trust them.
                                                                                                                     
40 Id. at 1207–08.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1208.
43 Balkin, supra note 37, at 1209.
44 Id. at 1207–08.
45 Id. at 1208.
46 Id. at 1207–08.
47 Id. at 1208.
48 See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 58–100 (2015) (discussing the 
secrecy involved in corporate collation, analysis, and use of personal data).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, SNAP INC. (June 5, 2017), https://www.snap.com/en-
US/privacy/privacy-policy/ [https://perma.cc/P99H-75JT].
52 See generally PASQUALE, supra note 48.
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I argue that businesses like these have many of the trappings of traditional 
fiduciaries.53 They collect information about us. They watch us, but we cannot 
easily watch them; we become dependent on them and vulnerable to them, and 
so we have to trust them.54 Such relationships traditionally have led to fiduciary 
status.55 Hence I argue that these businesses should have legal obligations to be 
trustworthy toward their end-users. They are the digital age versions of 
information fiduciaries.56
Nevertheless, the duties of digital age information fiduciaries are different 
from those of doctors and lawyers. They are more limited because of the kind 
of services they render and because of the kinds of reasonable trust they create.57
First, unlike doctors and lawyers, monetizing personal data is central to 
many online service companies, because it allows them to subsidize the services 
they provide or to offer them for free. Merely recouping expenses or making a 
profit from such information doesn’t by itself violate their fiduciary duty.58
Second, many online providers, like search engines and social media sites, 
make money because end-users produce a constant stream of content and links. 
Thus, unlike traditional professionals, these companies have an interest in 
getting people to reveal as much about themselves as possible—or otherwise 
express themselves in public as much as possible—so that their activities will 
generate content and data that companies can index and analyze.59
Third, people expect doctors to do far more than merely not harm them; 
people also expect that doctors will look out for their interests and warn them 
about potential risks to their health, their diet, and so on. People do not expect 
such comprehensive obligations of care from their ISP’s, search engines, and 
social media sites.60
Because of these differences, digital information fiduciaries should have 
different and fewer obligations than traditional professional fiduciaries like 
doctors, lawyers, and accountants. They are special-purpose information 
fiduciaries, and the kinds of duties that it is reasonable to impose on them should 
depend on the nature of the services they provide. 
The central obligation of digital information fiduciaries is that they cannot 
act like con artists—inducing trust in their end-users to obtain personal 
information and then using that information in ways that betray that trust and 
work against the interests of their end-users.61 Online businesses should not be 
able to hold themselves out as providing digital safety and respecting digital 
privacy and then manipulate and discriminate against their end-users; nor should 
                                                                                                                     
53 Balkin, supra note 37, at 1221–22, 1228.
54 Id. at 1207, 1222.
55 Id. at 1207.
56 Id. at 1221.
57 Id. at 1225–26.
58 Id. at 1225–27.
59 Balkin, supra note 37, at 1225–27.
60 Id. at 1226–27.
61 Id. at 1224–25.
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they be able to sell or distribute data about their end-users to companies who 
will not abide by similar duties of care and good faith.62
Currently, law does not treat these digital businesses like fiduciaries. But I 
have argued that it should. The law should extend fiduciary obligations to these 
companies and clarify the duties that online firms owe to their customers and 
end-users.63
Now think about home robots and smart houses. Home robots and smart 
houses collect an enormous amount of information about us which, in theory, 
can be collated with information about many other people that is stored in the 
cloud. Home robots and smart houses, in other words, aren’t simply stand-alone 
products. They are always-on, interconnected cloud entities that rely on and 
contribute to huge databases. Although we may come to trust the home robot 
and the smart house—indeed, we have to—the entity that we really have to trust 
is not the robot or the house. It is the company behind the robot and the house 
that collects the data from the robot and from the house’s sensors. And that 
company, I argue, should be an information fiduciary.
The owner of the fiduciary duty, in other words, is not the robot. It is the 
company that manufactures, installs, sells and operates the robot in our home. It 
is the Rabbi, and not the Golem, that owes us fiduciary obligations.
The first law of robotics for the algorithmic age, therefore, is that those who 
develop and employ robots, AI agents, and algorithms have duties of good faith 
and trust toward their end-users and clients. Fiduciary duties apply whether a 
business or entity uses robots, AI agents, or machine learning algorithms in 
delivering services.
Home robots and smart homes are obvious examples. Other examples might 
be services like Airbnb, Uber, OKCupid, Match.com, and 23 and Me. What 
matters in each case is that the businesses induce trust and collect personal 
information about us and might use it in ways that betray our trust and/or create 
a conflict of interest.
Earlier I noted that the classic examples of fiduciary obligations arise in the 
professions. In fact, robots, AI agents, and algorithms are likely to be 
increasingly employed in the operations of traditional fiduciaries—doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, and money managers. The federal government recently 
issued new rules through the Labor Department that will treat investment 
                                                                                                                     
62 Id. at 1224–25, 1227; id. at 1233 (arguing that digital information fiduciaries “may 
also have duties to ensure that, when they sell or convey this information to others, duties of 
non-disclosure and non-manipulation travel with the data”).
63 Id. at 1223–24, 1226–29. See also Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand 
Bargain To Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/
[https://perma.cc/R6G4-UVKC] (arguing for a new “Digital Millennium Privacy Act”).
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advisors who handle retirement accounts as fiduciaries.64 These advisors, in 
turn, are increasingly turning to AI and algorithms to do their jobs.65
The idea of fiduciary obligations also extends to governments that use 
robots, AI agents, and algorithms in their everyday functions, including the 
delivery of social services. Governments have duties of care and loyalty toward 
the populations that they govern.
VI. SECOND LAW: ALGORITHMIC OPERATORS HAVE DUTIES TOWARD 
THE GENERAL PUBLIC.
Because governments have fiduciary obligations to the people they govern, 
governments and public entities who use algorithms are information fiduciaries 
toward the populations they govern.
What about private actors? Some private actors, as we have seen, are 
information fiduciaries toward their clients, patients, and end-users. But not 
every private online business that uses robots, AI agents, or algorithms is an 
information fiduciary. Perhaps equally important, fiduciary duties generally 
extend only to a business’s clients and end-users, and not to the general public 
as a whole.66
So the idea of information fiduciaries is not sufficient to explain all of the 
various obligations of private companies that use algorithms, AI agents, and 
robots. Businesses that employ algorithms in their operations may still cause 
harms to people who are not their clients or customers, and with whom they 
have no contractual relationship.67 Examples are employers who are deciding 
whether to hire people or loan money to them—that is, enter into contractual 
relations with them—and credit reporting companies, who create our online 
reputations that others will employ.68
If we simply excluded all of the businesses that affect people but have no 
contractual relationships with them, we would be replicating a problem that 
emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. In a modern industrial 
economy, businesses generated mass-produced goods that were no longer sold 
to consumers who directly contracted with them.69 Instead, a chain of 
                                                                                                                     
64 Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,997 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2510.3–21 (2016)).
65 See Brian O’Connell, Will Robo-Advisors Benefit from the Fiduciary Rule?,
THESTREET (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14009692/1/will-robo-advisors-
benefit-from-the-fiduciary-rule.html [https://perma.cc/VB8M-YUNA] (“[R]obo firms are in 
good position to step in and snap up clients left behind by larger firms, who may shift their 
business focus to larger, more affluent clients as they adjust to the new fiduciary rule.”).
66 Balkin, supra note 37, at 1232–34.
67 See infra Part VII.
68 Balkin, supra note 37, at 1232–33.
69 See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Strict Products Liability at 50: Four Histories, 98 MARQ. L.
REV. 555, 566–67 (2014) (recounting the standard history).
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intermediaries brought these goods to market.70 Consumer protections based on 
privity of contract were unsuited to new economic realities. As a result, courts, 
beginning with Cardozo’s famous 1916 decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor 
Co.,71 abolished the privity rule and held that manufacturers had public duties, 
not only to direct consumers who purchased the products from intermediaries, 
but also duties to their family members and to bystanders who were injured by 
defective products.72
If we are to articulate the rules of the Algorithmic Society, we need 
something like MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. for the Algorithmic Society. 
That is, we need to recognize that the use of algorithms can harm not only the 
end-user of a service, but many other people in society as well. For example, 
Jonathan Zittrain has pointed out how Facebook might use its data on end-users 
to manipulate them in order to swing a national election.73 If that were to 
happen, it would affect not only the people with Facebook accounts, but 
everyone in the country. Similarly, when companies use algorithms in high 
speed trading, they can precipitate a market crash that affects not only the people 
they trade with, but everyone in the country, and indeed, the world.
It follows then that companies owe duties to the public when they employ 
robots, AI agents, and algorithms. But we can’t describe the duties that they owe 
the public in terms of breach of trust toward clients, patients, and end-users. If 
these duties are not premised on betrayal of trust, what are they based on? This 
brings me to the third law of the Algorithmic Society.
VII. THIRD LAW: ALGORITHMIC OPERATORS HAVE A PUBLIC DUTY NOT 
TO ENGAGE IN ALGORITHMIC NUISANCE
What do I mean by algorithmic nuisance? Here I make an analogy to private 
and public nuisances—smells, smoke, sounds, poisons, and especially pollution. 
Traditionally, these were harms associated with the use (and misuse) of real 
property, but the idea has expanded in recent times to include a wide range of 
harms.74 A private nuisance imposes harm on the recognized legal interests of a 
                                                                                                                     
70 Id.; see also Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 402 (N.Y. 
1962) (“The world of merchandising is . . . no longer a world of direct contract.”).
71 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
72 Id. at 1053.
73 Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 335–36
(2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/06/engineering-an-election/ [https://perma.cc/F4WX-
29B3]; Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever Finding 
Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-
fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/3FUN-W2K9].
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(describing nuisance as “human activity or a physical condition that is harmful or annoying 
to others”).
2017] THREE LAWS OF ROBOTICS 1233
relatively small group of people;75 a public nuisance diffuses harm over an 
indefinite population, and it is up to the state authorities to decide whether to 
bring an action to abate the nuisance.76 In the alternative, the government must 
decide whether to create a scheme of government regulation akin to consumer 
or environmental protection.77
Obviously, I am not claiming that algorithmic harms are nuisances in the 
traditional common-law sense of that term. In particular, I am not saying that 
algorithmic harms are nontrespassory invasions of the private use and 
enjoyment of real property.78 Rather, I argue that the best way to think about 
these harms is by analogy to torts like nuisance.
Why do I analogize the harms caused by algorithms to nuisance? I do so for 
three reasons. The first is the homunculus fallacy. We can’t argue that the 
algorithm itself has bad intentions. Rather, the algorithm is used by human 
beings who want to achieve some particular set of managerial goals, but in the 
process, end up harming various groups of people. Some of these victims are 
easy to identify, but the harms to others are more diffuse.
In essence, we are talking about the socially unjustified use of 
computational capacities that externalizes costs onto innocent others. In tort law, 
                                                                                                                     
75 Id. § 821E & cmt. a (“The liability for private nuisance exists only for the protection 
of persons having ‘property rights and privileges,’ that is, legally protected interests, in
respect to the particular use or enjoyment that has been affected.”).
76 Id. § 821B(1) (“A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right 
common to the general public.”); id. § 821C(1) (stating that public officials must bring suits 
to abate a public nuisance unless a private individual suffers a harm different in kind from 
that suffered by the general public). In the past twenty years, state attorneys general have 
attempted to expand the concept of public nuisance to create a remedy for mass torts, public 
health problems, and environmental pollution. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power 
Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314–15 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that states could sue power companies 
for excessive carbon dioxide emissions under federal common law of public nuisance); 
Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The Transmutation of Public 
Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 943–44 (2007) (“American jurisprudence 
has been experiencing another ‘assault upon the citadel’ in suits against asbestos, gun, and 
former lead paint manufacturers . . . [using] the lesser-known tort of ‘public nuisance.’”); 
Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
741, 743–44 (2003) (describing recent use of public nuisance suits by both state officials and 
private litigants to recover damages allegedly arising from tobacco-related diseases, firearm 
violence, and childhood lead poisoning); see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Game Over? 
Why Recent State Supreme Court Decisions Should End the Attempted Expansion of Public 
Nuisance Law, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 629, 629–31 (2010) (describing and criticizing the 
expansion of public nuisance law beyond its traditional doctrinal boundaries). 
77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(b) & cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(noting that legislatures and administrative agencies may determine that certain conduct 
constitutes a public nuisance, thereby obviating the need for an additional showing of 
unreasonable interference).
78 Id. § 821D & cmt. a (noting that private nuisance has traditionally been concerned 
with nontrespassory invasions of interests in the use and enjoyment of land). Public nuisance, 
by contrast, might be concerned with broader matters like public health, safety, or morals. 
Id. § 821B & cmt. b.
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we might call this externalization of a nuisance, whether public or private.79
And indeed, in a recent article on how to regulate algorithmic policing, Andrew 
Selbst has argued that the appropriate remedy is to require police departments 
to create discrimination impact statements akin to environmental impact 
statements.80 What is characteristic about algorithmic discrimination, Selbst 
argues, is that it cannot easily be identified with malice or bad intentions, either 
on the part of the officers using the programs or the programs themselves.81 The
algorithm doesn’t have intentions, wants, or desires. That is the homunculus 
fallacy. There is no little person inside the algorithm who is directing it. Hence 
it is useless to model the duty or liability of algorithm operators on a respondeat 
superior theory—you can’t impute intentions, negligence, or malice from the 
algorithm to the operator, even—and especially—a self-learning algorithm.
Instead, we have to focus on the social effects of the use of a particular 
algorithm, and whether the effects are reasonable and justified from the 
standpoint of society as a whole. Instead of drawing analogies to criminal law 
or the law of disparate treatment in antidiscrimination law, the best analogies 
are to nuisance and environmental law.82
The second reason to analogize the problem to nuisance is that the harms of 
algorithms are matters of degree. In addition, the harms of algorithmic nuisance 
                                                                                                                     
79 Critically surveying the new enforcement actions based on public nuisance, Keith 
Hylton argues that there is a coherent rationale for the expansion of public nuisance, albeit 
one not always reflected in the case law: “Nuisance law induces actors to choose socially 
optimal activity levels by imposing liability when externalized costs are far in excess of 
externalized benefits or far in excess of background external costs.” Keith N. Hylton, The 
Economics of Public Nuisance Law and the New Enforcement Actions, 18 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 43, 44 (2010).
80 Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 49 GA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 44), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819182 [https://perma.cc/
67NC-Y6VE].
81 Id. at 32 (“The problems of discrimination in data mining, however, are not those of 
motive, conscious or unconscious.”). Often the discriminatory effects arise from the way a 
particular problem is framed for the algorithm to solve, rather than from unconscious 
motivations on the part of the police or programmers. Id.
82 See A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: 
Learning from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2015) 
(“Market failures, collective action problems, and especially information asymmetries—
including, we have recently learned, a stunning lack of government transparency about 
domestic surveillance—characterize the current privacy crisis, much as they did the 
environmental problem in the 1960s.”); Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner 
Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV.
1, 23 (2006) (arguing that “[t]he privacy injuries of the Information Age are structurally 
similar to the environmental damage of the smokestack era” because of negative externalities 
and problems of collective action); cf. Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online 
Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 465–
66 (2011) (noting how co-regulatory models in environmental law may be relevant to privacy 
protection).
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result from the cumulative effects of data collation, analysis, and decision-
making on people’s digital identities.
Selbst points out that the harms caused by algorithmic discrimination don’t
fit well into a simple binary categorization of yes or no—i.e., either you have 
discriminated or you have not.83 Rather, there are inevitable tradeoffs in design 
and in how programmers formulate the problem an algorithm is being asked to 
solve.84 It may be difficult to determine a baseline of nondiscriminatory action 
against which to measure the algorithm’s operation, and it may be difficult (if 
not impossible) to isolate the effects of the algorithm’s operations to a single 
cause.85 Ultimately the relevant question is whether you have imposed too many 
unjustifiable costs on innocent third parties. Algorithmic discrimination, like 
pollution, is a matter of degree.
The third reason for the analogy to nuisance is that it helps us understand 
how the harms of the Algorithmic Society arise from cumulative decision-
making and judgment by a wide range of public and private actors. Companies 
and governments use Big Data and algorithms to make judgments that construct 
people’s identities, traits, and associations.86 These digital constructions of 
identity and traits affect people’s opportunities—to employment, credit, 
financial offers, and positions. They also shape people’s vulnerabilities—to 
increased surveillance, discrimination, manipulation, and exclusion. Companies 
and governments collect data about people from multiple sources and process 
the data to make new data. In processing data and making decisions, companies 
and governments contribute to the cumulative construction of people’s digital 
identities, traits, and associations, which, in turn, constructs people’s future 
opportunities and shapes their vulnerabilities.87
Other companies build on these collections of data, scores, and risk 
assessments and on the resulting digital constructions of traits, associations, and 
identity.88 Companies and governments employ all of this information 
creatively in ever new contexts of judgment, yielding ever new insights, 
judgments, and predictions. In this way, people’s lives are subject to a cascade 
of algorithmic judgments that fashion identity, opportunities, and vulnerabilities 
over time. Imagine, if you will, your digital identity as an informational stream 
into which a collection of new judgments, scores, and risk assessments are 
constantly being tossed.
                                                                                                                     
83 Selbst, supra note 80, at 48–49.
84 Id. at 47–48.
85 Id. at 47–48; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CAL. L. REV. 671, 677–92, 718–19 (2016).
86 See ROBINSON + YU, KNOWING THE SCORE: NEW DATA, UNDERWRITING, AND
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As more and more businesses participate in the collective process of digital 
identity shaping, this cascade of judgments increasingly shapes people’s lives. 
It may shift a wide range of socially unjustified costs onto people in the form of 
constricted opportunities and enhanced vulnerabilities. The concept of 
algorithmic nuisance tries to capture these effects on individuals as public and 
private actors toss more and more judgments into the stream of information that 
represents individuals and is used to judge, classify, and control them.
The central problem we face today, therefore, is not intentional 
discrimination, but cumulative harm to identity and opportunities. Using 
algorithms repeatedly and pervasively in areas like policing, employment, 
housing, and access to credit will have cumulative effects on populations, as 
decision-makers draw on multiple sources of data to construct people’s digital 
identities and reputations.89
In some cases, the harm may be traceable to careless programming and 
operation—mistakes in code, unreasonable assumptions, or biased data. Or it 
may result from the unreasonable use of algorithms, data sources, previous 
classifications, and categorizations employed for new purposes for which they 
were not designed. But in many cases the programmer and user may be able to 
make a plausible claim that their initial model is reasonable, given the task at 
hand, the data analyzed, and the background assumptions of the model. Even 
so, handing off decision-making to algorithms over time will predictably cast a 
wide range of harms onto individuals and members of particular groups.
A central concern is how identity—the association of persons with positive 
and negative associations and traits—is constructed and distributed in the 
Algorithmic Society. Decision-makers economize on decision-making not only 
by making their own algorithmic judgments, but also by importing algorithmic 
judgments that other parties have made about people’s attributes, 
trustworthiness, and reputation.90 Credit scores are an obvious example, but they 
are only a primitive illustration of what an Algorithmic Society can accomplish 
over time.
Instead of starting from scratch by developing their own scoring algorithms, 
decision-makers can economize by using scores and judgments already created 
by other algorithms used in different contexts and for different purposes, and 
modifying and updating them to suit their needs.91 Some of the most important 
insights of the Algorithmic Society come from reimagining how data collected 
for one purpose might be used to shed light on what seemed at first to be an 
unrelated phenomenon or problem. 
                                                                                                                     
89 Id.
90 Id. at 4, 5 fig. 1.
91 Id. at 6; Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About 
You, PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-
about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you [https://perma.cc/3V72-XRWZ] (explaining how 
data brokers collect and sell information gathered from many different sources for many 
different purposes).
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Firms specialize in collecting, collating, and distributing people’s identities 
to other decision-makers, who add their decisions to a growing digital stream or 
dossier.92 This means that people’s identities—including the positive and 
negative characteristics attributed to them—are constructed and distributed 
through the interaction of many different databases, programs and decision-
making algorithms. And in this way, people’s algorithmically constructed 
identities and reputations may spread widely and pervasively through society, 
increasing the power of algorithmic decision-making over their lives. As data 
becomes a common resource for decision-making, it constructs digital 
reputation, practical opportunity, and digital vulnerability.
In this world, focusing on intentional tort or even on the negligent 
construction and supervision of algorithms may be inadequate. Instead, the best 
analogy in tort law theory may be to the social costs that arise from socially 
unjustified levels of activity. Increased activity levels produce increased social 
costs, even when an activity is conducted with due care. Even assuming that the 
firm exercises due care—which, of course, it may not—the cumulative effects 
of increased activity may nevertheless throw too much harm onto the rest of 
society.93 These are characteristic situations of nuisance.
Increased activity levels and increased social costs may arise when firms 
adopt new technologies that allow them to increase their levels of activity.94 In 
this case, the switch to a new technology—algorithmic decision-making—
allows governments and businesses to make more decisions affecting more lives 
more pervasively and more cheaply. The Algorithmic Society increases the 
rapidity, scope, and pervasiveness of categorization, classification, and 
decision; in doing so it also increases the side effects of categorization, 
classification, and decision on human lives. These side effects are analogous to 
the increased levels of pollution caused by increased factory activity.
To be sure, it takes two to create an injury. The social costs of algorithmic 
decision-making also arise from the actions of injured parties. Perhaps, then, we 
should also give citizens incentives to expose themselves less to the side effects 
of algorithmic judgment. But, in the Algorithmic Society, injured parties cannot 
easily absent themselves from seeking jobs, housing, medical care, and 
participating in the quotidian features of everyday life. In the Algorithmic 
Society, people throw off the data that later will be employed to judge them 
simply by living in a digital world. Nor can people easily contract to avoid the 
harms of algorithmic judgment. The collective action problems are enormous, 
not to mention the costs of obtaining information about their situation. In the 
Algorithmic Society, people’s digital identities are produced by many different 
actors, their digital identities flow to a wide range of decision-makers, and the 
decisions are made by entities about which people know little.
                                                                                                                     
92 Beckett, supra note 91.
93 See Hylton, supra note 79, at 48.
94 Id.
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If we follow the analogy to nuisance then, the Third Law of Robotics is that 
algorithm operators have a duty to the public not to “pollute,”—that is, 
unjustifiably externalize the costs of algorithmic decision-making onto others. 
Just as the transformation to an industrial society predictably increased the 
amount of social pollution, the shift to an Algorithmic Society will predictably 
increase the side effects of data collection, computation, and algorithmic 
judgment.
What are these costs or harms? Consider some of the most common harms 
created by the Algorithmic Society. These harms, I should emphasize, are in 
addition to traditional physical harms, such as those created by self-driving cars 
or industrial robots, and the dignitary harms caused by surveillance and 
exposure:
(1) Harms to Reputation. There are two central ways that algorithms affect 
reputation: the first is classification; the second is risk assessment. Algorithms 
affect reputation by branding you and others like you as risky—in other words, 
what it means for you to be you is a certain kind of risk or propensity. The way 
that risk manifests will be different in different contexts. It might include the 
idea that you (or the people who live in a particular area) create a financial risk, 
an employment risk, a risk of committing a future crime, a risk of expending 
lots of social services, a risk of returning items or being a costly customer, a risk 
of wasting ad dollars because you won’t buy anything, and so on. In this case, 
algorithmic harm is the imputation that you are a risky person, which is a kind 
of stigma.
Risk assessment usually accompanies classification; the algorithm affects 
your reputation by placing you in a category or class, which is not necessarily 
an assessment of risk. The algorithm constructs groups in which you are placed 
and through which you are known and therefore potentially acted upon. 
Classification can affect your reputation without an assessment of risk because 
it says what kind of person you are and who you are treated as equivalent to 
(and, implicitly, better than or worse than according to some metric).
(2) Discrimination. Because of the assessment of risk and/or because of the 
work of classification, the enterprise that employs the algorithm denies you 
opportunities that it offers others (a credit card, a loan, a job opportunity, a 
promotion); or it imposes special costs (susceptibility to stop and frisk, 
surveillance, higher prices, exclusion from gun ownership or access to air travel, 
etc.) that it does not impose on other people.
(3) Normalization or Regimentation. The algorithm causes you to 
internalize its classifications and assessments of risk, causing you to alter your 
behavior in order to avoid surveillance or avoid being categorized as risky. It 
causes you to alter your identity, behavior, or other aspects of personal self-
presentation in order to appear less risky to the algorithm, or to fall into a 
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different category; in the alternative, you engage in behavior that the algorithm 
does not pay attention to.95
(4) Manipulation. Human beings and organizations can use algorithms to 
lead you and others like you to make (more or less) predictable choices that 
benefit the algorithm operator but do not enhance your welfare and may actually 
reduce your welfare. In addition, algorithmic analysis makes it easier for 
companies to discover which people are most susceptible to manipulation, and 
how they can most easily and effectively be manipulated.
(5) Lack of Due Process/Transparency/Interpretability. The algorithm 
makes decisions that affect your welfare in one of the ways noted above without 
transparency, interpretability, an explanation of inputs and outputs in layman’s
terms, an ability to monitor the algorithm’s operations, a means of providing 
rebuttal, or a method of holding the algorithm and its operators accountable.96
We might sum up this discussion by saying that algorithms (a) construct 
identity and reputation through (b) classification and risk assessment, creating 
the opportunity for (c) discrimination, normalization, and manipulation, without 
(d) adequate transparency, accountability, monitoring, or due process.
How are these harms related to the idea of algorithmic nuisance? These 
harms are the side effects of computerized decision-making. They are the social 
costs of algorithmic activity.
The pervasive adoption of algorithms greatly increases the level and 
pervasiveness of computational decision-making in our lives. Algorithmic use 
saves decision-makers money, and thus may be reasonable from the standpoint 
of an individual firm or decision-maker, but in the process it may impose 
cumulative harms on individuals and groups.97
Imagine, for example, a set of algorithms used to identify prospective 
employees. The algorithm may be good enough to fill up the small number of 
available slots with qualified people, but it excludes a large number of people 
who would also be qualified. (In this case, we would say that it creates very few 
                                                                                                                     
95 Note that by conforming their behavior to algorithmic judgment or hiding themselves 
from data collection and algorithmic analysis, potentially injured parties can alter their own 
activity levels, and thus reduce the total social costs of algorithmic judgment. As noted 
before, it takes two parties to create a harm. But this way of reducing costs begs an important 
question: one must first demonstrate that society may reasonably demand a particular form 
of social regimentation or social isolation from its citizens.
96 There is now an important literature grappling with the problems of due process in 
algorithmic decision-making and how best to address them. See generally Barocas & Selbst, 
supra note 85; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process 
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Danielle Keats Citron, 
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008); Kate Crawford & Jason 
Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework To Redress Predictive Privacy 
Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work,
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017); Joshua A, Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 
U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017); Selbst, supra note 80.
97 See Hylton, supra note 79, at 48 (noting how technological change may increase 
activity levels and social cost).
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false negatives, but many false positives.) Even so, the data and reputational 
scores used and produced by the algorithm may feed into databases used by 
others, including not only future employers but many other decision-makers 
operating in many other contexts. Or imagine a policing algorithm that sends 
police to neighborhoods where police have already been arresting people, thus 
reinforcing the notion that the area is especially high crime and needs additional 
police surveillance.
The point of the Algorithmic Society is to increase the opportunity, speed, 
and cost-effectiveness of decision-making. Firms employ algorithms to save 
money, and to perform repetitious tasks and calculations on a vast scale that 
would be prohibitively expensive, or even impossible, for humans to perform. 
This allows firms to ask questions that would previously have been 
unanswerable and to make decisions that would previously have been 
prohibitively expensive to formulate and adopt. 
This phenomenon—more kinds of decisions more cheaply made—is just 
another example of the substitution effect that is characteristic of robotics 
generally. We substitute algorithmic judges and calculators for human ones. But 
the choice of algorithms, the choice of categories, the kind of data collected, and 
the distributed creation and maintenance of digital identities have social costs, 
whose burden is shifted onto others—onto the general population, or onto 
particular segments of the population, like the poor, or minority communities.
In addressing algorithmic harms and algorithmic discrimination, our goal is 
not smoking out bad intention. Posing the question that way is yet another 
example of the homunculus fallacy. Rather, the goal, as more and more 
companies shift to algorithmic decision-making, and increase their levels of 
decision-making activity, is to require firms to adopt methods that are justified 
from the standpoint of society as a whole. Just as in the case of public nuisance, 
the state must decide how best to make businesses internalize their costs.
Frank Pasquale has also pointed out that, to the extent we use this approach 
to algorithmic nuisance, we must be able to identify the persons or organizations 
who are using the algorithm that is imposing costs on the rest of society.98 That 
is, algorithms must be designed so that we can tell which persons or 
organizations are employing them. The Golem must be traceable to a Rabbi or 
group of Rabbis. In many cases—finance, employment, policing—
identification of the user will not be difficult because the organization that is 
using the algorithm identifies itself. But in many cases, the algorithm and the 
data it uses will have been constructed by many organizations working together. 
There could also be cases in which algorithmic decision-making is made by 
anonymous or pseudonymous persons or organizations. Then the law will have 
to require disclosure of who is behind the algorithm in order to enforce a public 
duty.
                                                                                                                     
98 Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, 
Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1248–
51 (2017).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The hope and the fear of robotics and artificial intelligence has been with us 
from the earliest days of literature. Even today, journalists write stories raising 
the specter of out-of-control robots, algorithms, and AI agents who will soon 
take over our world. My goal in this Lecture has been to offer a corrective. 
Talking this way locates the danger of the Algorithmic Society in the robots, AI 
agents, and algorithms themselves. But the true danger is, and always has been, 
in the people—the organizations and businesses that adopt and employ these 
devices, and use them to affect, control, and manipulate other human beings. If 
we were all as pious as the Maharal, we would not need to fear the Golem. 
Because we are not, we need to learn how to restrain ourselves.

